Introduction
One of the striking features of normative theorizing in philosophy (as well as in related fields, such as political theory) is the diversity of concepts that feature centrally in it. In particular, it is commonplace for different theorists to offer different glosses on the overarching normative questions they are interested in, using what appear to be distinct concepts.
Consider, for example, broadly ethical inquiry. Suppose we focus our attention on a specific agent in a completely determinate set of circumstances. Even if we bracket the idea that normative inquirers do frame their investigations using different normative concepts, it is very plausible that they could. And given this possibility, normative inquirers face an interesting set of questions concerning what normative concepts they should use. This is a central part of what we call the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry. We take conceptual ethics to encompass a range of issues about the normative and evaluative assessment of concepts and words. If we focus on a specific agent in a specific context, two central questions in conceptual ethics are: which concepts that agent should use, and which words she should use to express those concepts. 2 The aim of this paper is to explore two main questions in the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry. The first question concerns whether to orient one's 2 We here draw from (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a) and (Burgess and Plunkett 2013b) . As emphasized in (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a) , in calling this area of inquiry conceptual "ethics", we do not mean to privilege the idea that broadly moral/political norms matter here more than others. It could be, for example, that we should (at least in certain contexts) use those concepts that best carve reality at its objective joints, regardless of any broadly moral/political norms (e.g., regardless of whether it makes our lives go better or worse).
normative inquiry around folk normative concepts or around theoretical normative concepts. For example, KNOWLEDGE The second question that we explore is whether to orient one's normative inquiry around concepts whose normative authority is especially accessible to us, or around concepts whose extension is especially accessible to us. For example, the normative authority of OUGHT TO DO ALL THINGS CONSIDERED might seem especially clear, while its extension will seem intensely controversial in many important cases.
By contrast, it is relatively clearer what falls in the extension of BETRAYAL, but more controversial how normatively significant betrayal is in many important cases.
In this paper we do not aim to adjudicate these two questions in conceptual ethics. Instead, we have two central goals. First, we aim to make vivid a range of possible positions that one might occupy with respect to these questions. Attention to this range of options can be valuable for properly grasping the relationships between many existing normative theories, as well as existing methodological approaches to normative inquiry. It can also help to reveal approaches to normative inquiry that might otherwise remain obscure. We often survey these options in a relatively neutral manner. However, we do not mean to imply that all of these positions are ultimately equally good. With this in mind, our second goal is to highlight a range of schematic arguments favoring certain options over alternatives.
In so doing, we hope to contribute to the long-term goal of adjudicating among those options.
The question of whether to orient inquiry around folk or theoretical concepts arises in many different kinds of inquiry. By contrast, the question of whether to orient inquiry around authority-revealing or extension-revealing concepts lacks obvious parallels in other areas of inquiry. As we aim to show, these two issues can interact in interesting ways, making it fruitful to explore them together.
We organize our discussion into four sections. Section 1 focuses on the choice between on folk vs. theoretical normative concepts. Section 2 introduces questions about which words to use to express the folk or theoretical concepts we deploy. Section 3 concerns the choice between authority-revealing and extensionrevealing normative concepts. These discussions explore arguments within the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry. Section 4 steps back from this focus, to a more theoretical question about the very practice of engaging in reflection about conceptual ethics. In particular, it explores the question of how we should understand -as well as how we should choose -the normative standards and concepts that we deploy when engaging in conceptual ethics.
Folk vs. Theoretical Concepts
This section concerns the question of whether normative inquiry should be oriented around folk concepts or theoretical concepts. For example, in theorizing about norms for action, should we focus on trying to understand which actions satisfy the folk concept MORAL RIGHTNESS or instead Allan Gibbard's theoretical concept THE THING TO DO? 4 We canvass several reasons to favor using folk normative concepts, and theoretical normative concepts, respectively. Before proceeding, however, we first clarify several key assumptions that guide our discussion.
First, the issue we are focusing on here is not whether to use folk or theoretical concepts in normative inquiry. We take it that we will likely want to use both such concepts in any reasonably developed inquiry. The question is rather:
which such concept should we use to state our central theoretical questions, and the answers to those questions that we seek? When a concept plays both of these roles in an inquiry, we will say that the inquiry is oriented around that concept. Questions of how to individuate concepts and words are highly relevant to the foundations of conceptual ethics. 6 We cannot, however, responsibly argue for answers to these questions here. Instead we aim to clarify our own usage.
We will think of concepts as components of thought, and words as linguistic vehicles. Somewhat more specifically, we will take concepts to be individuated by something like their inferential role at the level of thought (for suitable concepts, we will assume that inferential roles determine intensions). And we will take concept-users' inferential dispositions to provide significant (although defeasible) evidence of the inferential roles of the concepts tokened. Turning to words: we will not take words to be individuated by their meanings. For example, we will allow that a single word 'bank' can have one meaning that is about the sides of a river, and
another that is about financial institutions. And we will understand the meanings of words (perhaps only at an instance of use) in terms of the concepts they are used to express.
These are regimenting assumptions intended to simplify discussion; much of what we say could be straightforwardly reframed given different assumptions on these matters. For example: if you think that there are two different English words written as 'bank', everything we say could be re-phrased in terms of groups of homophonous but distinct words. Another, perhaps more important example, concerns our use of the term 'concept'. For much of our discussion, what will really matter to us are patterns of inference that are closely associated with the use of a given word (e.g., the word 'moral'). This is because it is these patterns of inference that will be most significant to the effects of the use of a given word in the context of normative inquiry. When we treat these divergent patterns of inference as evidence for the presence of distinct concepts, much of what we want to say could instead be represented in terms of multiple systematic patterns of inference associated with the same concept.
We assume the following rough distinction between folk and theoretical concepts. Theoretical concepts have their home within a community dedicated to a certain relevant inquiry, and are used for the purposes of that inquiry. For example, consider the concepts one acquires when learning advanced physics, or advanced linguistics. Folk concepts have their home in thought and talk beyond the specialists in a given field of systematic inquiry. These characterizations surely admit of hard and borderline cases. However, they are often clear enough. For example, inquirers sometimes find it useful in their work to deploy the folk concept STRING (as in: "We tied the samples together with some string"), and the folk sometimes use the theoretical concept STRING THEORY. In these cases, we have no difficulty determining which side of the folk/theoretical divide is the natural home of the relevant concept.
It is also worth emphasizing that theoretical concepts are diverse. One standard function of distinctively theoretical concepts is to provide manifest precision: it can be theoretically useful to offer stipulations, explications, operative definitions, etc. in order to allow the assessment and transmission of relatively precise theses. Other theoretical concepts are introduced to allow us to aptly discuss and investigate certain important worldy phenomena. Where a worldy phenomenon is imperfectly understood, we may need to choose between explicit precision and tracking the important worldy phenomenon. In light of this, the virtues and vices that we explore below may not apply to all theoretical concepts.
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We now examine two classes of reasons to favor orienting normative inquiry around folk concepts. The first is motivated by the idea that it makes sense to inquire into questions that we care about. Consider the questions do I know anything? or is it morally wrong to eat meat?, as well as many other questions that lead people to become interested in normative inquiry in the first place. It is natural to think that such questions are framed using folk concepts. Given this, if one instead orients one's normative inquiry using theoretical concepts, there is a danger that one will simply have changed the subject, and failed to address the question one cared about in the first place.
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Notice that this argument starts with the issue of how the questions we address in inquiry are framed, rather than the materials that we use to answer those questions. Thus, it is compatible with using highly theoretical concepts in one's answer to the question of whether it is wrong to eat meat. However, many who are sympathetic to this line of thinking hold that the answers to questions must also be framed at least partly in terms of the same folk concepts (e.g. KNOWLEDGE, MORALLY WRONG) deployed in the question itself, in order to be an apt answer to that question.
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This sort of argument suggests an important concern to be attended to.
However, there are at least two reasons to be cautious about its force. First, on at least some natural ways of individuating folk concepts, a folk concept may include elements that you do not care about in a given instance when you are deploying that concept. Consider the following example. Carrie Jenkins motivates her exploration 7 The idea that there is an interesting distinction between folk and theoretical concepts might be controversial, especially given certain theories of content. For example, on some views, the content of folk natural kind concepts might be fixed by facts about expert usage.
(See, for example, (Burge 1979) and (Schroeter 2008) ). But recall how we are using the term 'concept': we think that versions of many of the points here could be reformulated within the sort of theory of content just mentioned, by focusing on contrasting inferential implications of certain uses of words. 8 See (Strawson 1963) and (Jackson 1998) for articulations of this kind of worry. 9 See, again, both (Strawson 1963) and (Jackson 1998 (Jenkins 2006) . 11 For further discussion about preserving "sameness of topic" despite shifts in concepts, see (Cappelen Forthcoming) and (Thomasson Forthcoming A second reason for orienting inquiry around folk concepts arises from the idea that our ability to learn about certain normative facts might be mediated by 12 See (Plunkett 2016) for relevant discussion of the significance of conceptual history for the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry. 13 For a brief discussion of this sort of broadly Marxist-inspired take on morality, see (SinnottArmstrong 2006, 208) . For helpful critical discussion of Marx's own (more subtle) views on morality, see (Wood 1999) . 14 Notice that on some sophisticated theories of folk concepts (e.g., (Jackson 1998) ), the content of our folk concepts might turn out not to vindicate all of ordinary speakers' inferential dispositions for using those concepts. On this sort of picture, even if folk inferential dispositions for using a concept are objectionable in some way, the intension of the concept might not be objectionable in this way. Jackson also grants that sometimes theoretical reflection can reasonably lead us to care about something other than the folk concept we start with (Jackson 1998, 44-45) . 15 For a clear example of this line of thought with respect to the concept TRUTH, see (Scharp 2013 might also be things we should care about. This might in turn lead us to miss important aspects of the normative issues at hand. In short, the switch to theoretical concepts might leave us with worse tools for investigating our normative topics at hand (even if such a switch still preserved "sameness of topic" in relevant ways).
Indeed, we might end up with worse tools here without even fully realizing that this is so; something which might well make the shift to the new "reformed" concepts particularly dangerous.
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Tied to this worry is the question of how good we are at judging the merits and dangers of attempts to depart from conceptual folkways. Perhaps, as a general matter, one takes a dim view of our abilities here. This might then be combined with a strong version of the thesis that our ability to learn about key normative facts is mediated by trained cognitive capacities, which are largely implicit and largely accessible via deployment of our folk concepts. This combination of views might be used to support a kind of intellectual analogue of Burkean conservatism in social/political philosophy, according to which we should largely defer to our current conceptual repertoire, or at least let it change slowly and gradually and be highly skeptical of attempts to radically change it quickly with "conceptual revolutions".
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The fact that folk concepts are central sites of social learning, however, can also provide grounds for caution about orienting one's normative inquiry around folk concepts. For the influences that shape our implicit grasp of normative concepts need not tend towards accuracy or reliability. For example, moral and political concepts, from IMMORAL to JUST to CHASTE are exceptionally natural targets for ideological forces. Such ideological contamination might render our intuitive grasp of the relevant concept unreliable, even if it does not infect the inferential role of the concept itself.
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Next consider two types of reason supporting orienting normative inquiry around theoretical concepts. First, consider "explicated" theoretical concepts that can be explicitly and uncontroversially characterized in relatively precise terms. One reason to adopt such concepts is that explicitness and precision can be highly useful in normative investigation. And it may be extremely difficult (if possible at all) to
achieve an explicit precise characterization of a relevant folk concept. Further, explications can be tailored to match what the inquirer cares about most in inquiry (to the extent this is clear to her).
There are at least two reasons to be cautious about this sort of consideration, however. First, at least on some theories of meaning or content, explication or stipulation provide no guarantee of meaning. For example, some theorists will argue that even if 'atom' was introduced to pick out the simple indivisible constituents of matter, the term functioned in important ways in physics independent of that definition, allowing it to turn out that atoms are neither simple nor indivisible.
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Second, precision might be positively misleading, if the subject matter being studied itself lacks precise boundaries. Aristotle famously emphasized this point, and took it to apply to certain normative inquiries. 20 17 (Burke 1790 (Burke /1982 . 18 For connected discussion, see (Jones 2005) , (Railton 2003) , and (Eklund 2017, ch. 7) . 19 Compare (Schroeter and Schroeter 2014) . 20 (Aristotle 2002 .
A second reason to orient normative inquiry around theoretical concepts is that they, as a general kind of concept, have a track record of relevant usefulness.
Inquiry in the natural and social sciences often involves the introduction of new theoretical concepts. For example, think of the concept QUARK in physics, or the concept IMPLICIT BIAS in the social sciences. Because the natural and social sciences include important paradigms of successful inquiry, this might suggest that orienting around theoretical concepts can contribute to the success or significance of an inquiry. Plausibly, theoretical words and concepts are often introduced because inquirers identify a need for new concepts in order to promote their aims as inquirers. One might hope that the theoretical concepts that emerge in normative inquiry can similarly help us to better achieve the aims of such inquiry.
One reason for caution about this reason is that its force plausibly depends greatly on the degree of similarity between normative inquiry (and what it investigates) and scientific inquiry (and what it investigates). And there is great
controversy concerning this very question. 21 We return to this issue in Section 4.
At the start of this paper, we claimed that, if we focus on a specific agent in a specific context, two central questions in conceptual ethics are: which concepts that agent should use, and which words she should use to express those concepts. In this section, we have canvassed some reasons for favoring orienting normative inquiry around folk concepts, or around theoretical concepts. This is an instance of the first kind of issue in conceptual ethics. In the next section, we now turn to the second kind of issue, about concept/word pairing.
Concept/Word Pairing
There are a wide range of philosophically rich issues in conceptual ethics that bear on which words to use in order to express a given concept. For example, the use of certain words might be advocated because (i) their use in relevant contexts promotes certain broadly epistemic goals (such as the pursuit of knowledge of a given subject matter -e.g., in physics or moral philosophy) 22 and/or (ii) their use in relevant contexts promotes certain broadly practical goals (such as the political goal of helping foster a more just or free society, or the ethical goal of living a better life or avoiding causing unjust harms to others).
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the full range of such issues as they apply to the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry. Instead, our goal is to focus on a specific cluster of issues connected to our discussion in the previous section of whether to orient one's inquiry around folk or theoretical concepts. The specific cluster of issues we focus on arise from the fact that certain words that are central to existing normative inquiry (such as 'moral' or 'rational') are associated with several significantly different inferential patterns. As we will show, this entails that normative inquirers face interesting questions about which words to use to express either folk or theoretical concepts.
To begin, we distinguish folk from theoretical words. As we shall understand them, folk words are words used to express one or more folk concepts. Similarly, theoretical words are words used to express one or more theoretical concepts. Given this way of drawing the distinction, some words will be both folk words and theoretical words. This is true, for example, of 'rational' and 'moral'.
To make the idea of associated inferential patterns vivid, we will focus on the word 'moral.' Consider the range of competing philosophical accounts of what distinguishes moral thought and talk from other normative thought and talk. Some associate morality with attitude-independent categorical norms. 24 Others associate it with an impersonal point of view, 25 or a distinctively interpersonal one. 26 Still others associate it with the fittingness conditions for attitudes of certain emotions, such as guilt, resentment, and anger. 27 Others associate it with a list of supposed "platitudes" about morality that include both things about the subject matter of 22 See, for example, (Carnap 1950 (Carnap /1962 , (Railton 1986) , and (Brandt 1979 (Brandt /1998 . 23 See, for example, (Haslanger 2000) , (Railton 1986) , and (Brandt 1979 (Brandt /1998 . 24 (Williams 1985) . 25 (Sidgwick 1874) . 26 (Scanlon 1998) and (Darwall 2006) . 27 (Gibbard 1990 ).
morality (e.g., which kinds of activities it regulates) as well as things about its (at least purported) relative normative import. 28 And many assume or defend a kind of rationalism about moral obligation, according to which, if you morally ought to perform an action you therefore ought to perform it, in the most authoritative sense of 'ought'.
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Our aim here is not to adjudicate among these proposals. Rather, we want to emphasize that -at least in our broad social/historical context -each of these proposals captures an idea that can seem natural to associate with the word 'moral', at least in some circumstances. We can understand these associations as connected to inferential patterns: in at least some circumstances, it will seem natural to infer from the presence of a moral property to the presence of one of these associated properties, or vice-versa.
On some views about how to individuate folk concepts, it might be that each of these competing proposals correctly analyzes one among many folk concepts that are sometimes expressed by 'moral.' Suppose that this were so. This would pose a clear danger that many exchanges among normative inquirers could end up being "merely verbal disputes", where speakers "talk past" each other in their discussions.
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Merely verbal disputes can stall the progress of inquiry, or hinder it in other ways (e.g., by leading to confusion on the part of participants). 31 However, our focus here is not on these dangers that verbal disputes may pose for normative inquiry. Rather, it is with related (but distinct) issues: issues that we think are under-appreciated in 28 See (Smith 1994) . Cf. (Foot 1972) . 29 (Korsgaard 1996) . 30 See (Chalmers 2011) and (Jenkins 2014) for helpful general discussions of verbal disputes. 31 This is not to say that every time there is variation in word meaning speakers are doomed to end up in a merely verbal dispute. In some cases, the speakers might still express genuine disagreements when they utter claims using a term 'X', despite this variation in meaning. For example: the parties might be involved in a metalinguistic negotiation. In cases of metalinguistic negotiation, a speaker uses (rather than mentions) a term to advocate for a view about how that very term should be used. Speakers in a metalinguistic negotiation might well express conflicting normative views about how a word should be used -views that will standardly be based on normative considerations about things other than words and concepts (e.g., how we should live, how we should organize our social/political institutions, or what objective joints there are in reality) -even if those views are expressed through pragmatic mechanisms (rather than in terms of literal semantic content). See (Plunkett and Sundell 2013) for further discussion. See also (Thomasson 2016) and (Ludlow 2014) for connected discussion.
the practice of contemporary normative inquiry (even if many practitioners of normative inquiry will, on reflection, agree these are issues to be reckoned with).
Suppose for the sake of argument that the word 'moral' picks out a single concept MORAL across the range of uses relevant to normative inquiry (i.e. setting aside obviously different uses like 'the moral of the story.') Nonetheless, as we suggested above, many distinct inferential patterns are associated with the word 'moral' in our social/historical context. Even if one such inferential pattern is no part of the concept MORAL, it could still play an important role in explaining how we in fact reason using that concept. This raises two dangers for the use of such words in normative inquiry, even for the inquirer who intends to use the folk word 'moral' to express the (allegedly unique) folk concept MORAL.
First, the plurality of ideas associated with 'moral' raises what we will call the implicit switching danger. The danger is that an inquirer could easily infer from the satisfaction of one associated idea to a moral status, and then from that moral status to a different associated idea, even if one of those inferences is not part of the concept MORAL. For example, one might infer that an action was morally required from its being demanded from a distinctively interpersonal point of view. One might then infer from the action's being morally required that one has an authoritative obligation to do it. Unless these are both necessary conditions on the concept MORAL, this inference could lead one astray.
The plurality of associated ideas also raises what we will call the unreliable inference danger. This is the danger that, in some contexts, when one attempts to consult one's moral intuitions, one instead retrieves an intuition generated by an associated idea that is not constitutive of the concept MORAL.
Against these dangers, one must weigh a straightforward reason to use familiar, as opposed to obscure or novel words: speech or text composed of such words will generally be easier to understand. To see this, imagine a book that begins by introducing a long list of explicitly defined novel terms, and then proceeds to use only the newly defined terms in the text that follows. Such a book will be much harder to understand than a book conveying the same ideas using familiar words.
Insofar as folk words are typically more familiar than theoretical words, this issue about comprehensibility suggests a presumptive reason for using folk words.
So far, we have focused on the use of folk words to express folk concepts.
However, it is also common for normative inquirers to appropriate existing folk words as vehicles to express their theoretical concepts. For example, explications take this form. 32 One reason to use existing folk words to express an unfamiliar theoretical concept is that it can help to orient you (and your audience) to roughly what you want to be talking about. Another reason is that it might be an important element of a campaign to get a group of speakers (e.g., all ordinary speakers, or a specific subset of philosophers, or a group of political activists, etc.) to reform their usage to accord with your preferred usage.
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The use of folk words to express theoretical concepts faces both the implicit switching danger and the unreliable inference danger. For any folk term, a competent speaker will tend to find natural the inferences that they have come to associate with that term. And this may lead them to make these inferences even if they are not licensed by the theoretical concept they are using.
To make this vivid, consider Ronald Dworkin's use of the term 'morality' in Justice for Hedgehogs. Dworkin stipulates that there is a "distinction between ethics, which is the study of how to live well, and morality, which is the study of how we must treat other people." 34 This stipulated definition of 'morality' means that we won't have specifically "moral" reasons or obligations (etc.) that stem directly from the welfare of at least many non-human animals, or the status of the natural environment. (And perhaps we will also lack "moral" reasons that arise from the welfare of human infants, depending on how we cash out 'people.') Because the stipulation is fully compatible with there being weighty 'non-moral' reasons arising from (e.g.) the welfare of infants or non-human animals, it is not clear whether this fact about the consequences of the stipulation is a problem. However, we think this 32 See, for example, (Carnap 1950 (Carnap /1962 , (Carnap 1947 (Carnap /1956 ), (Railton 1986) , and (Brandt 1979 (Brandt /1998 . 33 This sort of campaign might be explicit. See, for example, the discussion of race and gender terms in (Haslanger 2000) and the discussion of 'true' in (Scharp 2013) . Or it might occur via metalinguistic negotiation. For discussion of this latter option, in the context of the use of philosophical terms, see (Plunkett 2015) . 34 (Dworkin 2011, 13) . It should be noted that others follow Dworkin in this stipulated usage when framing their discussions. For example, see (Appiah 2005, xiii) drawing on (Dworkin 2000) .
sort of stipulation, and the fact that it excludes considerations about the entities we have highlighted, illustrates important worries in conceptual ethics.
One worry is that this stipulation potentially invites unreliable inferences:
we might infer conclusions about Dworkin's stipulated topic from ideas associated with the folk concept MORAL, or vice versa. A deeper worry is that the stipulation faces an especially worrisome instance of the implicit switching danger. Many ordinary people take 'morality' to pick out something that is particularly normatively important. It will be hard for many to shake this association. This threatens to make illegitimate inferences more likely: e.g., inferring, without argument, from a claim about something being "moral" (in the stipulated sense) to a claim about its distinctive normative importance, relative to other kinds of considerations. This means that using the term 'morality' to refer to Dworkinian morality threatens to undercut giving certain normative considerations their due in normative reasoning. This is especially worrisome if the kinds of considerations being ruled out involve entities (e.g., many non-human animals, human infants, or humans that lack certain cognitive capacities) that are already objectionably marginalized in our actual social/political practices, normative inquiry, or both.
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It is worth emphasizing that this is not intended as a point about any particular philosopher's psychology. Insofar as normative inquiry is a social endeavor, these issues will be important when they arise for members of the community of inquirers who attempt to engage with or use this explication.
Notice that a related danger can arise even for philosopher who is careful not to stipulate the meaning of 'moral' in this way. For example, consider T. M.
Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other (1998). Scanlon offers a contractualist
account not of morality as a whole, but "…of a narrower domain of morality having to having to do with our duties to other people, including such things as requirements to aid them, and prohibitions against harming, killing, coercion, and deception." 36 This is roughly the same part of the normative that Dworkin and 35 For connected discussion here about the case of 'justice', in particular with respect to the way it interacts with normative concern for non-human animals, see (Plunkett 2016b) . 36 (Scanlon 1998, 6 (Scanlon 1998, 6) . 38 See (Cohen 1984, 283) , (Huemer 2001, 22) , and (Smithies 2012, 274) , respectively. 39 For discussion and critique of equating justification and rationality, see (Sylvan Manuscript) . 40 For one place in contemporary epistemology that relies on this distinction, see (Weatherson 2008) and (Littlejohn Forthcoming) , which both offer replies to the "New Evil Demon Problem" (see (Cohen 1984) ). Note that our calling attention to this conceptual distinction is fully compatible with the possibility that the correct theory of epistemic justification turns out to vindicate a tight connection between epistemic justification and rationality, and hence certain patterns of inference involving them.
though much of this discussion doesn't involve any specific stipulation of terminology.
Thus far, we have considered the use of folk words in normative inquiry. This has led us to say some things along the way about the virtues and vices of using explicitly theoretical words. We now turn to that topic more explicitly.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, one reason for using theoretical words is to disambiguate. If there are many ideas associated with 'moral,' then using a novel theoretical term might help to focus one's attention on the specific concept one has in mind. This can be true even if the concept you wish to deploy is a folk concept. Consider three cases.
First, suppose that one is convinced that the correct understanding of the folk concept MORAL concerns when guilt and resentment are fitting. One might introduce a novel term to talk about this concept, rather than using the word 'moral,'
because one is worried about triggering associations between the word 'moral' and ideas unconnected to the conditions under which these emotions are warranted.
Second, some terms relevant to normative inquiry are associated with both folk and theoretical concepts. (As with 'moral' and 'rational'.) In light of this, one might want to explicitly flag that one is using a folk concept by using a theoretical word like 'folk morality' or 'folk rationality.'
Third, if you believe there are multiple folk concepts expressed by a given term, you might want to explicitly flag which one you are using, via introducing a technical term. For example, suppose that you believe that the term 'knowledge' is associated with at least two folk concepts: a factive concept, which philosophers have traditionally privileged, and a non-factive concept. 41 One might want to introduce a technical term, like 'non-factive knowledge,' to focus attention on which 41 This non-factive sense is prominent in the history and sociology of science, where scholars will sometimes talk about the "production of knowledge" concerning claims we now know to be false (but which were thought to be true at the time, or which were relied on in certain ways in scientific practice), as in (Shapin 1994) , and in psychology, as in (Gilovich 2001) . See also Michel Foucault's use of "knowledge" in his discussion of his idea of "power/knowledge", as in (Foucault 1980) , and in earlier work such as (Foucault 1966 (Foucault /2000 . For an apparently non-factive folk use, see (Seuss 1965) .
folk concept you intend to pick out. Mutatis mutandis, these same considerations can favor the use of theoretical terms to express theoretical concepts.
Next consider potential dangers associated with using theoretical terms. The first thing to note is that many theoretical terms (especially those with a significant history of use) have a plurality of ideas associated with them in theoretical contexts. This is true for many prominent theoretical terms in philosophy, like 'grounding', 'epistemic', or 'metaethics'. 42 On some semantic views, this divergence might undermine our ability to effectively refer to anything with these terms. Consider, for example, certain externalist theories according to which reference is determined in large part by expert usage. If it is indeterminate which (if any) experts one is deferring to in use of one of these terms, one might fail to refer to anything at all.
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Even setting this worry about reference failure aside, theoretical terms with a plurality of associated ideas will face the dangers of implicit switching and unreliable intuitions. For example, consider the term 'epistemic'. This is arguably a theoretical word in its central uses by contemporary philosophers engaged in normative inquiry. 44 In some cases, philosophers explicitly claim that properly "epistemic" justification must be the sort of justification that bears an explanatory connection to truth. 45 Others use the term 'epistemic' to pick out norms or values that are tied to the constitutive standards that govern beliefs, where it is then a further question whether or not those standards are truth-related or not. 46 Finally, some take the epistemic standards to be particularly normatively important or weighty with respect to all-things-considered normative theorizing about beliefs.
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42 For extensive discussion relevant to 'metaethics' see (McPherson and Plunkett 2017) . 43 See (Cappelen 2013) . 44 On this point, see (Cohen 2016) . 45 We endorse this explanatory connection in (McPherson and Plunkett 2015) . See (Berker 2013, §3) for references to epistemologists endorsing a range of similar theses. For a view that denies this kind of explanatory connection, see (Enoch and Schechter 2008) . 46 See (Nolfi 2014) . Note that Nolfi herself goes on to deny that belief aims at truth. See also (Nolfi Manuscript) . 47 One unusually explicit example: (Schroeder Forthcoming) presupposes that practical and epistemic reasons are of a kind, and explores potential explanatory priority relations between them. Elsewhere, Schroeder suggests that the normative is "…all about reasons" (Schroeder 2007, 81) , in (at least) the sense that the core normative facts that really matter can all be reductively explained in terms of normative reasons. As we have sought to make clear, the question of which words to use remains complex, even given a decision concerning whether to use folk or theoretical concepts. Many central terms in normative inquiry -both folk and theoretical -are associated with multiple theoretically significant ideas. We have argued that this raises significant dangers for normative inquiry.
These dangers are exemplary of a cluster of general issues in conceptual ethics concerning concept/word pairing. In the next section, we discuss whether to orient normative inquiry around extension-revealing or authority-revealing concepts. Many of the complications and dangers highlighted here about concept/word pairing also arise in connection with that issue. Having illustrated the general structure of this cluster issues about concept/word pairing here, we will merely touch on a couple of examples of this in the next section.
Authority-Revealing vs. Extension-Revealing Concepts
Consider two things that someone engaged in a normative inquiry might want from a normative concept. On the one hand, we care about which actions, states of affairs, etc. our normative concepts apply to. Given this, it would be attractive if there were a clear way of discovering these sorts of facts about a concept. On the other hand, it 48 For connected discussion, see (Cohen 2016) .
would be attractive if we were confident that normative conclusions framed in terms of that concept really mattered. Ideally of course, you could find a concept that possessed both of these features to a high degree. But it often seems that one in fact needs to trade these features against each other.
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To illustrate: an inquirer interested in norms that govern our practical lives might orient her inquiry using the concept POLITENESS. Or, she might focus on the concept MORAL WRONGNESS. Or, she might introduce a novel concept that she stipulates to be maximally normatively significant for deliberation or action. The contrast between authority-revealing and extension-revealing concepts might be taken to be equivalent with, or at least deeply tied to, the contrast between thin and thick concepts. 55 In rough terms, thick concepts (e.g. BRAVE, COWARD, KIND, JERK, etc.) involve a mixture of descriptive and normative application-conditions. 53 Douglas Portmore calls this the "least controversial normative principle concerning action" (Portmore 2013, 437 ). (Whether it is then a conceptual truth is a separate matter).
For an argument against understanding 'ought' in terms of 'most reason', see (Broome 2015) . 54 See (McPherson Forthcoming) for this proposal. 55 For example, parts of (Eklund 2017) seem to presuppose this equivalence. See, for example, (Eklund 2017, 18-19) .
The kind of mixture they involve is meant to contrast with thin ethical concepts (e.g. straightforward way on the basis of reflection on this concept. The rationales we consider below assume that such a project is not highly promising. 58 It is instructive to contrast this sort of ambitious constitutivist project with an attempt to introduce a concept by stipulating both that it is maximally authoritative, and that it has a 56 See (Roberts 2017) for an overview of thick concepts. 57 On this point, see (Kratzer 2012) and (Finlay 2014) . 58 Notice here that we are not setting aside the possibility of a slightly less optimistic constitutivism, according to which there is a concept whose authoritativeness and extension are both derivable via difficult constitutivist philosophical reasoning.
certain extension. It is plausible that this fails: we cannot stipulate our way to making anything we like maximally authoritative.
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We begin by considering a natural rationale for focusing on authorityrevealing concepts. Normative inquiry, like any inquiry, can be motivated by the desire to know (or better understand, etc.) facts about our world. However, it is very natural to think that normative inquiry can also be centrally motivated by the desire to discover answers that can (in some sense) directly guide our decisions about (for example) how to live, what to believe, or which social/political arrangements to support, promote, or protest. It seems plausible that answers framed in terms of authority-revealing concepts will be most obviously suitable to play this role of direct guidance.
Further, many philosophers who investigate normative topics without using authority-revealing concepts arguably do so because they assume a connection between these topics and authoritative norms. For example, in political philosophy, many philosophers who investigate issues about justice, freedom, and/or equality do so in part because they take considerations about these things to bear in important ways on how we authoritatively ought to arrange our social/political institutions. 60 Similarly, in ethics, many philosophers who investigate morality assume that morality is closely connected to the authoritative norms for action.
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And within epistemology, it is widely assumed that knowledge is intimately tied to the most authoritative norms for the regulation of belief.
62 59 For connected discussion, see (Prior 1960) . 60 See, for example, (Rawls 1971 (Rawls /1999 , (Sen 2009 ), (Nozick 1974) , (Anderson 1999) , (Satz 2010) , (Pettit 2012) , and (Dworkin 2011) . 61 E.g. (Smith 1994) and (Korsgaard 1996) . 62 On this front, consider the vast amounts of effort spent on thinking about the nature of knowledge in the wake of (Gettier 1963) . Some epistemologists might well be content to think of engaging in this enterprise as just investigating the contours of a concept we happen to employ, which picks out something with little connection to authoritatively normative facts about what we should actually believe (or how we should proportion our credences, etc.). However, surely part of why so many epistemologists have been concerned with the nature of knowledge is that they assume that issues about knowledge (e.g., who has it when) are normatively important. In a similar vein, consider the rise of so-called "knowledge-first" epistemology in the vein of (Williamson 2000) , which uses knowledge as the basis for many things we take to have normative import (e.g., evidence).
If we assume these commitments, one central reason to orient normative investigation around maximally authority-revealing concepts is that orienting it instead around EXPLOITATION or MORALITY or KNOWLEDGE may seem like a puzzling and potentially dangerous detour. At best, one investigates the topic of ultimate interest less directly than one could. But there are more significant dangers, which can be illustrated by considering the example of MORALITY. The fact that many inquirers focus on MORALITY is partly explained by the fact that normative authority is saliently associated with the word 'moral.' One danger is that the association with normative authority might not be vindicated by the correct theory of the inferential role of MORALITY. Even if the association is vindicated, the plurality of ideas associated with 'moral' raises the danger that framing one's inquiry in terms of this concept will make that inquiry vulnerable to the dangers of implicit switching and unreliable inference.
What can be said against this rationale for orienting one's theorizing around authority-revealing concepts? To begin, consider the idea that MORAL is not itself authority-revealing, but that certain moral facts ground the facts about what you authoritatively ought to do. If this were true, it might seem to make sense to investigate moral facts as a way of discovering what one ought to do. One thing to be said for this approach is that -assuming that all of its presuppositions are correct -such investigation might contribute to providing understanding of authoritative normativity, by allowing us to discover not just what we ought to do, but in virtue of what we ought to do it.
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Another rationale for investigating the grounds of normative facts is that one might think this is an especially promising way to discover what those facts are. One difficulty with this rationale is that priority in metaphysical explanation is not reliably correlated with epistemic access. To take a simple example, the fundamental microphysical facts presumably ground facts about the observable features of our environment. But ordinary people evidently have far more direct access to the latter 63 Note that one might view understanding as one goal of normative inquiry, or as the distinctive goal of normative inquiry. A case for the latter view might draw on parallel arguments that understanding is a constitutive goal of moral inquiry in (Hills 2009 ).
than we do to the former. So this rationale would require an argument that shows why it is such a guide in the case of the normative. For example, it might be that, at least in certain epistemic contexts, we have no good epistemic access to the relevant facts that doesn't proceed via learning about the facts that determine them. 64 But it is far from clear that this is so in the case of authoritatively normative facts, in the sorts of epistemic contexts that we standardly find ourselves in.
Consider a different epistemic argument for focusing on certain less authority-revealing concepts (e.g., perhaps MORALITY or EXPLOITATION), rather than directly on what one authoritatively ought to do. Recall from §1 the suggestion that we all have a good deal of (perhaps implicit) trained moral knowledge, as a result of our moral education. One might think that most of us lack a parallel training that is framed in terms of the concept AUTHORITATIVE OUGHT, or associated contributory notions, such as GENUINE REASON FOR ACTION. This might be because AUTHORITATIVE
OUGHT (e.g.) is a theoretical, and not a folk concept. But it need not be: the same point would hold even if it were simply a relatively obscure folk concept. If this is true, then, when one is considering a possible action, and asking oneself the question "authoritatively ought I to do this?" one might tend to come up blank. Or, one might tend to generate an answer that is based in one's implicit understanding of some other concept, such as WHAT SERVES MY PRESENT AIMS, or WHAT IS GOOD FOR ME, or MORAL RIGHTNESS, without interrogating the implicit inference to what one ought to do.
Suppose next that normative authority was part of the concept MORALITY, such that, at least ordinarily, if one morally ought to perform an action, one also authoritatively ought to perform it. If this were true, it might make sense to try to answer at least some questions about what we authoritatively ought to do by engaging in moral inquiry, and inferring conclusions about what we authoritatively ought to do from the moral conclusions found.
We can imagine parallel rationales for the other cases. For example, one might think that a similar argument could be made for orienting one's inquiry in 64 See (Greenberg 2006) for discussion of this idea within legal philosophy, in the context of discussing facts about the content of the law (in a given jurisdiction, at a given time (Copp 1997) and (Tiffany 2007) . See (McPherson Forthcoming, §6) for discussion. 66 See (Baker Forthcoming) . 67 See (McPherson and Plunkett 2017, §2. 3) for brief discussion of this possibility. For connected discussion, see (Finlay Forthcoming) . 68 See (Alston 2005) for a survey of some of the key views here.
explanation for this diversity is that -given the importance that many place on the topic of "epistemic justification" -many of these properties are ones that (at least some) philosophers associate with authoritative norms for belief. Another way to bring out the issue is to consider possible competing proposals concerning what it is for a norm to be authoritative for belief. For example, a natural proposal is that being authoritative for belief is a matter of being related to truth in the right way.
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Or perhaps it is a matter of being related to authoritative practical norms in the right way. 70 Or perhaps it is a matter of being the constitutive norm for the mental state of belief. 71 One possibility is that each of these proposals capture something that we care about in believing, but there is no single property being authoritative for belief.
Let's take stock of where we are. This section has sought to illuminate the interest and complexity of the question of whether to orient normative inquiry around authority-revealing or extension-revealing concepts. As we have indicated in certain places, the plausibility of answers to this question interact with the plausibility of answers to certain questions about folk vs. theoretical concepts. This underscores some of the interest in investigating these two different topics in the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry together.
Importantly, conceptual ethics is itself a kind of normative inquiry. This means that the issues in conceptual ethics we have discussed thus far also interact with how we understand and approach the very normative questions we have been posing in this paper. We now turn to this topic.
Evaluating the Norms and Concepts used in
69 (McPherson and Plunkett 2015) defends a related thesis about epistemic justification, which, as we just discussed, might well be taken by some to be tightly associated with authoritative normativity. On this front, consider our earlier discussion of those who take justification and rationality to be virtually equivalent (as discussed and criticized in (Sylvan Manuscript) ). In turn, many such philosophers who accept that (at least near) equivalency also take considerations of rationality to bear in significant ways on what we (authoritatively) ought to believe. (See, for example, (Wedgwood 2012) , in connection to (Wedgwood 2007)) . 70 This might be thought of as a kind of "pragmatist" explanation. See (McPherson and Plunkett 2015, 111) for discussion of a related thesis about the epistemic. For connected discussion, see (Enoch and Schechter 2008) . 71 For example (Shah and Velleman 2005 ) defend a constitutivist account of epistemic normativity. For connected discussion, see (Nolfi 2014) .
the Methodology of Normative Inquiry
So far in this paper we have explored the choices between focusing normative inquiry around folk or theoretical concepts (and words), and between focusing on authority-revealing and extension-revealing normative concepts. In doing so, we have introduced a series of normative considerations and arguments that bear on these choices. In seeking to assess these considerations and arguments, we can ask:
what sorts of norms should we be deploying in our methodological evaluation of normative inquiry? We can further ask: for any such answer, what would explain the aptness of that answer? In this section, we briefly consider three broad approaches to answering this latter question: (i) considering the significance of inquirer aims,
(ii) appealing to the results of metanormative inquiry, and (iii) engaging in further conceptual ethics, of the kind we have been discussing in this paper. We will also explore some of the ways that these approaches interact.
We begin by considering a natural proposal: that the normative facts about which normative concepts and words an agent should use in a given context are determined by facts about what promotes the aims that an agent has. 72 One way to motivate this instrumentalist idea is to notice that it seems to explain certain obvious data points. For example: if an agent aims to do work in sociology, then the concepts she should deploy are arguably different than those she should deploy if seeking to do work in physics. Or, to take another example: the concepts she should deploy when engaged in public political advocacy are arguably different than those she should deploy if seeking to do advanced theoretical work in political philosophy.
In both of these cases, it seems that what matters is what promotes the aims the agent has in each case. One elegant hypothesis is that, if the aims of inquirers explain normative facts about concept choice in these cases, perhaps they also do so in all cases. 73 Or more modestly, perhaps the aims of inquirers play this role in the 72 See (Anderson 2001) and (Haslanger 2000) for two places where this sort of idea is advanced. See (Burgess and Plunkett 2013b) for both sympathetic and critical discussion of this idea. 73 The motivation we have suggested here for instrumentalism about the norms of inquiry is adapted from the motivation that frames Schroeder's defense of the Humean theory of reasons in (Schroeder 2007 is something about the topic itself that determines how we ought to inquire into it.
Consider an example to see how this idea might apply to a normative inquiry.
Suppose that our aims make it the case that we are engaged in moral inquiry, and that the word 'moral' is univocal enough for this aim to fix a topic. Plunkett 2013b, 1105) . 75 See (McPherson and Plunkett 2017) . 76 See, for example, (Korsgaard 1996) , (Gibbard 2003) , and (Blackburn 1998) support the idea that the study of moral reality should be modeled on the methods of the sciences, arguably strengthening the case for using theoretical concepts. By contrast, consider a non-naturalistic realist metamoral view, according to which moral reality is metaphysically discontinuous with the reality studied in the natural and social sciences. 78 Perhaps that reality can only be accessed using specific kinds of a priori reasoning that, at its core, must involve the deployment of folk concepts all of us have prior to any particular theoretical training.
The possibilities sketched here for moral inquiry extend to other kinds of normative inquiry. In general, how we should proceed in normative inquiry may in significant part be determined by our progress in metanormative inquiry. 79 We understand metanormative inquiry as aimed at explaining how actual normative thought and talk -and what (if anything) that talk is distinctively about (e.g., normative facts, properties, etc.) -fit into reality. 80 As these brief examples suggest, the connections between overall metanormative views and the topics in conceptual ethics we have been discussing in this paper are rich and worth exploring further.
However, it is also worth flagging some of the limitations of this approach for informing the methodology of normative inquiry. 77 For example, see (Boyd 1997) and (Railton 1986) . Note that moral thought and talk might have some features that made it quite distinctive, despite the metaphysics and epistemology of morality being quite continuous with that of some sciences. See, for example, (Copp 2001) . 78 For example, see (Enoch 2011) , (Fitzpatrick 2008), and (Shafer-Landau 2003 82 We here echo what we say at the end of (McPherson and Plunkett 2017) . For connected discussion, see (Eklund 2017 inquiry, then perhaps it makes sense to structure inquiry around that (modulo the sorts of competing concerns discussed in Section 3). On the other hand, suppose there is not a most authoritative norm that applies here. Then it appears that, if one is guided by a norm in selecting among one's options, this norm will have no distinctive authority relative to competing norms you might have used for the purposes of selection. On this hypothesis, it would thus seem that arbitrary choice 83 For a systematic articulation of this idea for inquiry in general, and not just in the case of normative inquiry in particular, see (Sider 2012) . 84 This kind of goal underwrites key parts of the liberal tradition in political theory, as well some of the ideas behind the ideal of "public reason". For relevant discussion, see (Rawls 1996) , (Gaus 2011), and (Quong 2013) . 85 (Jaggar and Tobin 2013, 413) . They articulate this in the context of developing an overall account of moral epistemology, which they take to be rooted in core political ideals of feminism. 86 (Geuss 1981, 2) . Geuss takes this to be the central goal of critical theory as such, in the vein of the so-called "Frankfurt School" of critical theory. For connected discussion, see (Horkheimer 1937 (Horkheimer /1975 and (Habermas 1968 (Habermas /1987 we should be using to answer these questions in conceptual ethics. We take this to warrant attention: these questions are philosophically rich, relatively unexplored, and potentially have striking implications for how we should conduct normative inquiry.
Does this mean that normative inquiry needs to halt while we turn our attention to these methodological questions? Not at all. Some methodological inquiry in philosophy appears motivated by the idea that we cannot legitimately proceed in our other inquiries without first rebutting skeptical challenges, or otherwise using methodology to put our inquiry on a more secure footing. Tied to this, the boldest methodologists have Cartesian aspirations of finding indubitable methods and starting points to replace our shabby-seeming ordinary attempts to answer philosophical questions. Others dream of a method that -even if not indubitable -can usefully be followed by all, no matter how benighted their initial opinions. We take such motivations to be misguided. It might well be impossible for us to achieve either of these goals, at least in the near future. It is also far from clear how much we need such foundations to have reasonable confidence in the products of our philosophical theorizing. Finally, methodology is itself philosophy, so it is hard to see how it could provide a decisive antidote to worries about the legitimacy of philosophy.
Our approach is rooted in a different understanding of the value of methodology. Being more philosophy, methodological inquiry can be interesting and worthwhile for the same reasons other areas of philosophy can be. For example, it might be interesting because we seek understanding of ourselves, the world we live in, and our thought and talk about that world. In this spirit, we find it natural for (at least some) philosophers engaged in normative inquiry to be curious to better understand the activity they are engaged in, and the arguments that can be made for pursuing that activity in one way or another. With this in mind, we hope that this paper spurs more interest in the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry.
Further, even without Cartesian aspirations, we can hope that methodological reflection will help us to improve our inquiry. We think that this paper can potentially help normative inquirers to do better in at least two ways.
First, we take it that normative inquirers not only could make a wide variety of choices concerning which concepts to orient their normative inquiry around, but that they are in fact actually making different choices here. This diversity of practice is not always clearly signaled (including in some of our own previous work). We suspect that this is partly because the range of relevant options is rarely salient to those inquirers, with the result that there is no felt need to clarify one's target. We think the lack of clear signaling is also partly explained by the lack of a clear vocabulary for communicating the relevant orientation. The discussion in this paper can help us to understand each other's work better, by providing (what we hope is) a useful framework within which to locate distinct projects. Second, we hope that this paper paves the way for further methodological reflection that helps to adjudicate some of the central questions that we have asked in this paper. If so, this may enable some normative inquirers to focus their efforts more successfully on the questions it is most worthwhile to investigate, whatever those turn out to be.
